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The Breast Implant Controversy:
A Prism for Reform*
Benson Yang**
Introduction
The breast implant controversy is worthy of reflection because it
probes and tests the connections between so many levels of
contemporary American society. The debate is symbolic of a wave of
technophobia that has infected the nation in the latter half of the
twentieth century, especially with regard to modern medicine. Silicone,
by virtue of being a foreign chemical, and autoimmune disease, by
virtue of being a vaguely understood affliction, have combined to stir
much public anxiety. Since the first clamors of unrest, the controversy
has mushroomed to involve millions of women and billions of dollars.
Yet, to this day, no valid research study has shown a positive correlation
between silicone implants and any rare diseases.1 But claiming that
the breast implant controversy was merely about the safety of a small
fluid-filled bag is oversimplistic. The central issue has drifted far from
questioning the safety of the implants to what has contributed to the
snowballing of this seemingly uncomplicated matter. This paper
addresses the failures of existing regulatory and legal mechanisms as
specifically applied to the breast implant debate, but also pertinent to a
much wider spectrum of toxic tort cases which have become
commonplace with the advent of novel materials and technologies. The
breast implant controversy is, at its very core, about two uneasy
relationships - one between the government and the people, the other
between science and the courts.
* This article was awarded Second Place in the 2000 RISK Writing Competition.
** Benson Yang is a medical student at Yale University School of Medicine and will be
graduating in the Spring of 2001. Yang graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 1997 with an M.Eng. in Electrical Engineering/Computer Science, a B.S. in
Electrical Engineering/Computer Science, and a B.S. in the Humanities and Science. E-mail:
benson.yang@yale.edu.
1 Esther Janowsky, Lawrence Kupper, & Barbara Hulka, Meta-Analyses of the Relation
Between Silicone Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases, 342 New Eng.
J. Med. 781 (2000).
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The Government and the People
Despite their prevalence since the 1960s, silicone breast implants
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) until Congress amended the federal food and
drug statutes in 1976.2 Since the amendment was not retroactive,
breast implants were grandfathered, meaning that manufacturers of
implants prior to 1976 were not required to furnish evidence of product
safety and effectiveness. 3 With questions about the safety and
efficacy of implants slowly mounting, the FDA assembled an advisory
panel to review existing data on silicone implants in 1991. David
Kessler, then Commissioner of the FDA, proclaimed that, "the
standard for implanted devices is not, Let the buyer beware," and
instituted a ban on breast implants. 4 The availability of implants for
reconstructive purposes following cancer or other deforming surgeries
would not be hampered, but their availability for cosmetic purposes
would be drastically limited. 5 Since there had been no conclusive
evidence to suggest that implants were harmful, women with existing
implants were instructed to leave them in place. The FDA believed that
the risk of surgical removal and the attendant anesthetic risk was far
greater than the yet-undefined risk of leaving the devices intact. The
legal basis for Kessler's decision was incontrovertible: "the law requires a
positive demonstration of safety and the burden of proof rests squarely
with the manufacturer." 6 Nevertheless, legality rarely implies
prudence; perhaps the FDA should have considered a range of
alternatives before delivering such a shock to the American public.
In the face of uncertainty, the FDA thought it best to make a
conservative decision that erred on the side of safety. The rationale was
that if silicone breast implants were indeed found to be linked to
autoimmune disease, a preemptive ban could potentially save many
lives in the interim; alternatively, if implants were found to be safe, a
2 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 55 301-392 (1998).
3 David Kessler, The Basis of the FDA s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 New Eng. J.
Med. 1713 (1992).
4 W.S. Hein, Remarks at the Meeting of the Food and Drug Administration, General and
Plastic Surgery Devices Panel (Feb. 18-20, 1992).
5 Kessler, supra note 3.
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temporary ban would only delay an elective procedure. Had Kessler
decided otherwise, he might have jeopardized lives and betrayed the
mission of the FDA. Not surprisingly, the message that the FDA sent
to the million or so women with existing implants was unsettling. For
these women, the implication of the ban was that silicone implants were
sufficiently dangerous enough to warrant a retraction from the market.
Predictably, the FDA's reassurances that the implants had not been
proven to be harmful were of no consolation. Mixed messages from
agencies charged with the responsibility of protecting public health are
generally not taken lightly by the public. Stephen Breyer notes, "the
word uncertainty itself implies risk; the denial therefore carries a kind
of self-refutation that does not alleviate public concern." 7 The fact
that silicone, an abstruse chemical in the public's eye, was at stake only
compounded consternation. Many women, fearing the worst, fled to
their plastic surgeons to have their implants immediately removed.
Mass fear inspired mass litigation. In the first two years following the
ban, Dow Corning was named in 20,000 lawsuits.8
The FDA has also been accused of harboring a double-standard by
allowing silicone gel-filled implants for reconstructive purposes and
prohibiting their use for cosmetic reasons. In his statement to The
New England Journal of Medicine, Kessler stated that, "these
restrictions on the use of silicone-gel implants for breast augmentation
are not based on any judgment about values." 9 Yet, an analysis of
how the risk-benefit ratio was derived shows otherwise. There was
generally little debate that the benefits of implants outweigh the risks
for cancer patients; for many women, the availability of reconstructive
surgery was the deciding factor in their choice to undergo cancer
therapy. But the risk-benefit equation is more complicated concerning
breast implants for purely augmentative purposes. The risks included
the uncertain effects of silicone gels in the body and their potential to
cause autoimmune diseases. For reconstructive cases, "women are using
implants in diseased or deformed breasts as part of their treatment"; for
augmentative cases, "women for cosmetic reasons alone are risking
7 Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
8 Marcia Angell, Address at the Yale University School of Medicine Phyllis Bodel Memorial
Lecture (Nov. 6, 1997).
9 Kessler, supra note 3.
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healthy breasts." 10 The FDA took the position that there were no clear
physical benefits to receiving implants and therefore the risks clearly
outweigh the benefits. Yet the lack of physical benefits is not equivalent
to the lack of health benefits; there are well documented psychological
benefits for women who have had their breasts augmented. In effect,
the FDA unwittingly placed itself in the awkward and paternalistic role
of arbitrating the merits of women's choices.
If silicone gel-filled breast implants had been fully proven to cause
autoimmune disease or other harms, a ban would have been appropriate
and necessary. This was not the case. The FDA's decision to partially
ban a device whose risk was largely uncharacterized was a mistake.
Women who desired augmentation mammoplasty were not the only
ones to question the logic of the FDA's decision. Breast cancer patients,
many of whom had compromised immune systems and were more
prone to disease, must have wondered why implants were not safe for
healthy women but were safe for them.
The FDA, whose decisions wield immense power over public
reaction, must be definitive in its regulatory choices. In cases when
partial bans are necessary, the FDA should assume the responsibility to
fully educate the public about the rationale behind its decision.
Furthermore, regulation should be a cooperative enterprise; granted
that experts are more qualified to judge the technical merits of devices,
they also must not ignore public sentiments and concerns. This is not to
say that the FDA should never regulate substances and devices that
have not been well studied; on the contrary, the FDA has the
responsibility to act upon legitimate suspicions. But if the agency is to
send the public into a frenzy, it must do so only if it believes that
emerging evidence will support its conservative stance. The successful
thirty-year history of breast implants should have commanded
significantly more research before deciding to ban them.
One can argue that the cause of the entire silicone gel-filled breast
implant controversy was not faulty logic on the side of the regulators
but a lack of communication of this logic to the public. The mad rush
to have implants removed after the FDA's ban is a prime example of
how a federal agency, in trying to reduce risk, actually increased risk.
10 Philip Hilts, F.D.A. Restricts Use of Implants Pending Studies, N.Y. Times, April 17,
1992, at Al.
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Had women with existing implants been properly informed, they could
have weighed the relative risks themselves. As a regulatory agency, the
FDA must make its data and its decision-making process transparent to
the population that it hopes to protect. Kessler did not seem overly
alarmed when he explained the basis of his decision in The New
England Journal of Medicine; after all, breast implants had not been
shown to cause systemic diseases, and there were many proven toxic
substances which warranted more alarm. Why then did such a
seemingly benign move send shockwaves across the nation? In his
article, Kessler used words like "risk-benefit ratio" over and over again
but never really explained how this calculation was made. Likewise, he
referred to "unknown" risks but never presented existing evidence that
may have dispelled some of the unwarranted fears that were worrying
women with breast implants.
As Paul Slovic noted that: "[R]isk communication and risk
management efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured as a
two-way process. Each side, expert and public, has something valid to
contribute. Each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the
other." 1 1 In the future, the FDA and other regulatory agencies must
be more cognizant of underlying societal forces as well as public
perceptions that may be perturbed by regulation. They must foster
more comprehensive dialogue with the public; the ensuing relationship
will enlighten each side as to the concerns of the other.
Effective risk communication, particularly with regard to uncertain
risks, can be challenging. People have numerous sources of information,
each with varying degrees of appeal and validity (often related in an
inverse manner). Unfortunately, appeal is generally the decisive factor
for public acceptance. The FDA's choice to publish a bland statement
in a scientific journal is not merely unappealing but aims at convincing
only an elite subpopulation. There is no doubt that evaluating the risks
associated with silicone gel-filled breast implants is a complex and
controversial matter, but the FDA should not have summarily
dismissed the lay majority as incapable of understanding the basis of its
conclusions. Though the risks of breast implants were not established at
the time of the FDA ban, experts could have reasonably compared their
11 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987).
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potential risks to those of other products. Then, the agency should have
made an attempt to publicly and firmly elucidate its position. If Kessler
had arranged for adequate media exposure, his message would have
been regarded by a much larger audience. Americans, as consumers,
have good claim to be educated about products that are on the market.
Cass Sunstein has stated, "we have tended to ... regulate first, educate
only in exceptional cases." 12 Not only is "command-and-control"
regulation undemocratic, but it promotes public anxiety instead of
public health.
The inability of the FDA to provide a clear statement is only an
aspect of a much larger problem - random agenda selection. Although
there was insufficient information to quantify the exact risk of
contracting autoimmune disease from silicone gel-filled breast
implants, the agency could have reasonably surmised that the risk
would have been very low given the thirty-year history of implants in
America. One may question the justification for banning implants when
over 400,000 people a year die from cigarette smoking. 13 Kessler fell
prey to media pressures, and his good intentions needlessly caused
widespread public hysteria. Regulatory agencies, including the FDA,
have long been inclined to random agenda selection. Concerning
environmental agencies, Breyer has written:
Agency priorities and agendas may more closely reflect
public rankings, politics, history, or even chance ... one
cannot find any detailed federal governmental list that
prioritizes health or safety risk problems so as to create a
rational, overall agenda - an agenda that would seek to
maximize attainable safety or to minimize health-related
problems. 14
Regulatory agencies should consider devising a systematic index for
risk that would apply universally in evaluating dangerous substances or
devices. The most straightforward method would be to sequentially
regulate those substances which have the largest risk population and
which have been clearly characterized as harmful. Another method
would be to sequentially regulate those substances which are the most
12 Cass Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 21, 65 (1993).
13 Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States,
270 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2207.
14 Breyer, supra note 7.
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toxic and which threaten a significant risk population. Whatever
methodology for prioritization is deemed appropriate, regulation must
be executed from the top down. The list of goals cannot be dictated by
media frenzy or special interests. Only with a clear and structured set of
regulatory targets can the FDA attain the strict objectivity required to
evaluate the most pressing needs of public health.
Science and the Courts
The federal government created regulatory agencies to monitor and
prevent product-related injuries. As discussed above, the efficacy of
these agencies has been compromised by politics and lobbying,
especially by large corporations. Courts are better insulated from such
corrupting influences and have played a significant role in regulation
through product liability cases. Most dangerous products and toxic
substances were first exposed in individual tort cases before attracting
federal regulatory attention. Private litigation is particularly effective
because a manufacturer guilty of designing and marketing an injurious
product may be forced to pay substantial compensatory and punitive
damages to the injured. The repercussions of losing weighty cases on
profits and insurance premiums are reason enough for manufacturers to
strive for higher safety standards. Even the mere threat of product-
liability litigation has been sufficient to induce better product
designs. 15 In theory, civil litigation is a potent and effective stimulant
for social change. In practice, however, this system is capricious at best
and ineffective in general. Companies have struggled because "[tihe
federal structure of the U.S. legal system operates to the disadvantage
of manufacturer-defendants. A decision in a particular state benefits all
plaintiffs attorneys in that state and harms manufacturers in all states
since any manufacturer whose products are sold in a state may be sued
there." 16 In many instances, well-meaning manufacturers have been
brought to their knees and invested in defensive measures rather than
safety innovations. 17
15 Stephen Teret & Michael Jacobs, Prevention and Torts: The Role of Litigation in Injury
Control, 17 Law, Med., and Health Care 17 (1989).
16 Paul Rubin & Martin Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 807 (1994).
17 Peter Huber, Liability- The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988).
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The plaintiffs' bar and consumer advocacy groups have called for an
FDA ban on silicone gel-filled breast implants for some time. Even
before the debate intensified, lawyers' groups actively solicited women
as potential plaintiffs in lawsuits against implant manufacturers.
Attorneys placed advertisements and sought to represent women who
experienced even the slightest problems with their implants. The
announcement of the FDA ban only spurred more frightened and
angry women to sue for damages. Those who had only minor problems
with their implants began to wonder whether they were plagued by
something more serious. In the 30 years that silicone gel-filled breast
implants were available before the FDA ban, Dow Corning was the
target of approximately 200 lawsuits; in each of the two years after the
ban, Dow Corning faced 10,000 cases. 18 In 1994, a class action suit
concluded with the largest settlement in history.19 Manufacturers were
to contribute $4.25 billion for implant recipients claiming to have
autoimmune diseases, for implant recipients who develop symptoms for
autoimmune diseases over the next 30 years, and for implant recipients
claiming emotional distress. When Dow Corning, the largest
contributor to the settlement, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May
1995, the settlement fizzled, and a revised settlement was drafted.
The plaintiffs' bar has greatly contributed to repeatedly inundated
judicial systems and ruined industries. Particular to the American legal
system is the use of contingency fees as a method of compensation,
presumably to accommodate those who cannot afford attorneys' fees.
As a result, plaintiffs' lawyers commonly receive one-third of each
monetary award. The banning of silicone gel-filled breast implants
represented a windfall for plaintiffs' attorneys in terms of lawsuits
against implant manufacturers. Contingency compensation, coupled
with unusually large awards, created strong incentives both for women
with breast implants and for attorneys to sue. Manufacturers, knowing
that losing just a few large cases in court could ruin them, were at the
complete mercy of plaintiffs' lawyers and were often forced to settle
even weak cases out of court. Instead of honest representation, the
current system allows greed and corruption to reign. The elimination of
18 Angell, supra note 8.
19 Gina Kolata, Details of Implant Settlement Announced by Federal Judge, N.Y. Times,
April 5, 1994, at Al6.
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contingency fees, as is the standard in other countries, might alleviate
the problem at hand but has come across significant resistance in the
past. Reduction of the contingency-fee percentage paid to attorneys is
also likely to be ineffective, if not counterproductive, as lawyers could
simply solicit more clients or demand greater damage awards in court.
Instead of reformulating the contingency fee system, reform should
begin with the standardization of damage awards. At present, "[jlury-
determined damage awards are varied. Even when judges determine
damage awards, results are varied. Results differ based on judge or jury
makeup, based on who the parties are, and based on who the lawyers
are." 20 If the legal system were to institute a schedule of payments,
much abuse would be avoided. Certainly, arguments can be made
concerning the uniqueness of each case and the right for each person to
be tried as an individual. But when a jury awards $25 million to a
woman whose claims were weak and unsubstantiated,2 1 there is need
for reform. Categorization of damage awards does not disregard
legitimate claims, but serves to ensure justice by protecting the
defendant from conceivable excesses.
A second reform measure is the redirection of punitive damages
away from the plaintiff, especially when it can be skimmed by
contingency-fee lawyers. In breast implant litigation, these awards have
been unusually large and, as such, have been virtual gold mines for
profit-seeking attorneys. By definition, compensatory damages
compensate for the losses experienced by the plaintiff. In the Western
legal tradition, it has long been accepted that punishment should be
exacted by a body of laws, not by individuals seeking to turn
misfortune into windfall. From this, it follows that punitive damages
should be awarded to the government, not to the plaintiff. Regulatory
agencies could then use these awards to fund programs which would
ensure the continued integrity of manufacturers and their products.
At a more ideological level, the breast implant controversy has again
illuminated the ineptitude of courts to evaluate scientific theories and
findings. In the current system, the plaintiffs burden is to convince the
20 Katharine Baker, Consorting with Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural
Resources and How We Should Value Their Loss, 22 Ecology L. Q. 677, 718 (1995).
21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 91-021770 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris
County Dec. 23, 1992) (jury verdict for plaintiff who claimed silicone from ruptured implant
caused wide array of illnesses).
12 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 121 [Spring 2001]
jury that the defendant's product caused or was a substantial factor
contributing to her harm. Exactly how this is done, with respect to
admissibility of scientific evidence or expert testimony, has been the
target of much speculation. In 1923, Frye v. United States established
that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." 22 This decision set forth "general acceptance" as a
standard for expert testimony and effectively barred unsubstantiated
claims from juries. It shifted the responsibility of judging scientific
methods and results from the jury to the scientific community. By
requiring a consensus, Frye protected the legal system from admission
of any expert, particularly adherents of "junk science," to the
courtroom. Critics claimed that Frye barred novel and ground-
breaking theories and unnecessarily withheld deserved compensation
for those who have been harmed until a consensus developed. In 1975,
the Federal Rules of Evidence established that admissibility of evidence
into federal courts did not require a general consensus among the
scientific community. Rule 702 authorized scientific testimony when
"it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 23 In effect, the Federal Rules of Evidence
facilitated the return of junk science. In breast implant litigation,
plaintiffs' attorneys were able to call experts who propounded wild
theories that implicated silicone gel as the cause of a wide array of
systemic diseases.
In 1993, the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals offered an important interpretation of Rule 702.24
The decision authorized judges to act as evidentiary gatekeepers by
deciding the reliability and relevance of experts' testimonies. Judges
were to examine only the "scientific validity" of an expert's "principles
and methodology," not the persuasiveness of his conclusions. In essence,
the quality of evidence was to be assessed as the primary determinant of
admissibility. Daubert offered a more conservative interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, but still evades the fundamental
22 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
23 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
24 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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dilemma of requiring lay juries and lay judges to make judgments on
technical issues. In traditional tort cases, jurors are as effective in
evaluating evidence as any expert. Their role is to determine whether
there was or was not a wrong inflicted upon the plaintiff by the
defendant; usually a straightforward evaluation of the evidence yields
an answer. But when technical issues are involved, evaluation can be
confounded by inexperience or ignorance. Years of training are required
to fully understand the implications and limitations of even a simple
epidemiological study; a lay juror cannot make an informed judgment
when the results of such studies are briefly presented to him. If the
American tort system is to be effective in judging technical matters, it
cannot subject science to lay persons who often are easily swept by
passions as opposed to scientific evidence. Foster et al. have suggested
that legal professionals become more informed about current consensus
in science and about technical issues involved in risk research. 2 5
However, these improvements would still leave scientific evidence to
non-expert intermediaries.
Consulting an expert panel in lieu of a jury for cases revolving
around technical issues, though not an infallible solution, will represent
a great step towards remedying the present travesty. The notion of a
"science court" has arisen with regard to several toxic tort cases and,
more recently, with regard to breast implant litigation. The difficulty
with evaluating technical evidence in the courtroom concerns the
incongruity between scientific and legal discovery. Whereas research
treads incrementally, critically, and consensually, trials move rapidly,
capriciously, and adversarially. Lay jurors struggle with understanding
scientific evidence, let alone perceiving its relevance after courtroom
contortions. The main shortcoming of Daubert is that it views judges
as informed gatekeepers when, in fact, they are often no more qualified
than their juries in matters of science. Shifting the burden of
competence from juries to judges does not ameliorate the situation;
rather, it beckons the return of junk science. A scientific panel
composed of representatives from specialties pertinent to the case at
hand, as well as experts who can contribute a broader viewpoint, is
essential to arrive at a critically reasoned judgment. In cases concerning
25 Kenneth Foster, David Bernstein, & Peter Huber, Science and the Toxic Tort, 261
Science 1509 (1993).
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claims that have not been well appraised by the scientific community, as
was true of breast implant litigation, epidemiologists are vitally needed
to evaluate any existing data. Their universal absence from breast
implant trials reaffirms the current system's inability to distinguish and
pursue relevant testimony. As is true of any set of individuals, personal
biases are likely to preclude purely objective conclusions. Nevertheless,
judgments made by those who can appreciate the complexities of the
issues involved are certain to be worthier than those which are made by
a lay jury.
Conclusion
The notion that a breast implant, a bag weighing but a few ounces,
could cause turmoil in so many contexts is ironic if not sobering.
Nevertheless, the silicone gel-filled breast implant controversy is
representative of the influence of science and medicine on late 20th
century America. The introduction of novel substances and advanced
devices will likely continue with an ever-expanding pool of scientific
knowledge. More and more, we will have to rely on others who have the
expertise to evaluate such products. Undoubtedly, we will also hear
from those who are less qualified. As we move forward, we must
remember the lessons from the breast implant controversy, as well as a
dozen other similar experiences that have already been forgotten. The
breast implant controversy has truly been a prism for reform, if only we
have eyes to see.
